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THE BATTERING PARENT SYNDROME: INEXPERT 
TESTIMONY AS CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
Since 1962, legislatures and courts have actively attempted to develop 
solutions to the problem of parental abuse and neglect of children. 1 
Because child abuse2 rarely occurs in the presence of witnesses, 3 prov-
I. In 1962, a team of psychiatrists and other specialists published a now-famous and enor-
mously influential study that first exposed the widespread nature of physical abuse of children 
by their parents. KEMPE, SILVERMAN, STEELE, DROEGMUELLER, & SILVER, THE BATTERED-CHILD 
SYNDROME, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962) [hereinafter cited as BATTERED-CHILD SYNDROME]. The study 
demonstrated that certain common classes of injuries to children were consistent with no other 
cause but physical abuse by custodial adults. See generally id. at 21-23; Annot., 98 A.L.R.2D 
306; McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults upon the Family: Part One, 50 MINN. 
L. REV. 1 (1965); Note, Battered Child Syndrome-A Forensic Pathologist's Viewpoint, 28 MED. 
TRIAL TECH. Q. I (1981). See also D. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN, 1-48 (1970); Light, 
Abused and Neglected Children in America: A Study of Alternative Policies, 43 HARV. EDuc. 
REV. 556-562 (1973). For example, during this period, all states enacted mandatory reporting 
statutes, requiring doctors, teachers and other professionals to report suspected incidents of child 
abuse to state agencies. I. SLOAN, CHILD ABUSE: GOVERNING LAW AND LEGISLATION 15, 17, 24-25 
(1983). Nineteen states require such reporting "by any person" having knowledge or reason to 
know. Id. at 17, 18, 24-25. Forty-five states impose a criminal penalty for failure to report. 
Id. at 43-44. In addition, physicians and hospitals may be held liable for injuries sustained by 
a child returned to her parents if medical personnel negligently failed to diagnose abuse. Landeros 
v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399,551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976). For discussion of the usual 
content of state reporting statutes, see Fraser, A Glance at the Past, A Gaze at the Present, 
A Glimpse at the Future: A Critical Analysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting 
Statutes, 54 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 641 (1978); I. SLOAN, supra at 15-69. 
2. The pitfalls of satisfactorily defining child abuse are well recognized. See generally Berger, 
The Child Abusing Family (Pt I), 8 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY, Fall 1980, at 53, 55 [hereinafter 
cited as Berger I]; D. GIL, supra note 1, at 35, 134-35; Child Abuse: The Problem of Definition, 
8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 729 (1975). State laws employ varied definitions, many of which rely on 
parental fault. For example, Minnesota's reporting statute, defines "Physical Abuse" as "any 
physical injury inflicted by a parent, guardian or other person responsible for the child's care 
on a child other than by accidental means." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(2)(c); (West Supp. 
1981). The same state's child protection statute, see infra note 10, does not define abuse, but 
mandates court intervention upon a finding that a child is "neglected" or "dependent." MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 260.015(6)(10) (West 1982). An adjudication of dependence must be entered upon 
a finding that the child is "without proper care because of the emotional . . . disability 
... of his parent." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 269.015(10)(d) (West 1982). While the focus of the 
reporting statute is on physical injury to the child, the adjudication of dependence may turn 
on differing notions of "proper care." Because of the possibility of unfettered judicial discretion 
in making such determinations, some commentators have proposed that all state intervention 
be limited to cases of demonstrable physical harm. See, e.g., IJA-ABA JoINT CoMM'N ON JUVENILE 
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1981). See generally J. GOLDSTEIN, A. 
FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979). 
3. See, e.g., Schleret v. State, 311 N.W.2d 843, 844-45 (Minn. 1981) ("Most cases of felonious 
assault tend to occur in a single episode, to which there are sometimes witnesses. By contrast, 
cases that involve" 'battered child syndrome' occur in two or more episodes to which there are 
seldom any witnesses.") For discussion of these and other evidentiary problems unique to child 
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ing that a child was injured in a non-accidental manner has presented 
the state with substantial problems. 4 A child's physical injuries may 
leave little doubt that she has been beaten, neglected, or sexually 
molested. 5 In the absence of witnesses, however, the state normally 
must prove its case by showing that the injuries occurred while the 
parent had exclusive control of the child. 6 This may be difficult to 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 
abuse proceedings, see generally Note, Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Child Abuse Prosecu-
tions, 63 GEO. L.J. 257 (1974) (noting lack of eyewitnesses, inability of child to testify due to 
age, immaturity, fear, or unwillingness, and urging expanded use of existing evidentiary excep-
tions such as hearsay and evidence of prior acts of abuse) [hereinafter cited as Evidentiary Prob-
lems]. See also Note, Evidence-Child Abuse-Expert Medical Testimony Concerning "Battered 
Child Syndrome" Held Admissible, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 935 (1974) (tracing the history of the 
battered child syndrome diagnosis and its acceptance by courts) [hereinafter cited as Evidence-
Child Abuse]. 
4. See generally Note, Family Law-Parental Rights-Principles of Res Ipsa Loquitor Apply 
to Proof of Child Abuse and Neglect, 9 TEX. TECH L. REY. 335 (Winter 1977-78) [hereinafter 
cited as Principles); Note, Legislation-Child Protection Proceedings Under Article Ten of the 
New York Family Court Act, 20 BUF. L. REV. 561 (1971); Evidentiary Problems, supra note 
3, at 261. 
5. For example, in State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1981), the child's injuries, in-
cluding multiple bruises, rib fractures, and hemorrhaging, were easily identified by the expert 
witness as the result of physical beating. Id. at 61-62. It would appear that most prosecutions 
for child abuse result from injuries so serious that the possibility of an accidental cause, typically 
claimed by the defendant, is easily discounted. See also People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 
504, 507, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921 (1971); Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 15-16. 
When child neglect or sexual abuse is charged, the physical evidence of the crime may be less 
clear, although prosecutions likely occur only when the state has a strong case. The problem 
of proof is most pronounced in civil abuse and neglect proceedings, where judges frequently 
are called upon to order foster care or other coercive intervention without substantial physical 
evidence of abuse. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.191 (West 1982), requiring a court to 
intervene upon a finding that the child is neglected or dependent: the former defined in part 
as "without proper parental care because of the faults or habits of his parent . . . , " MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 260.015(10)(b) (West 1982), and the latter defined in part as "without proper 
parental care because of the emotional, mental ... disability or ... immaturity of his parent," 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015(6)(d) (West 1982). The broadness of such definitions may lead 
a family court to enter a finding of dependency or neglect without evidence of any physical 
harm. E.g., In re Wachlin, 309 Minn. 370, 373-74, 245 N.W.2d 183, 185 (1976) (affirming find-
ing of neglect for handicapped child whose parents had refused to cooperate in efforts to provide 
speech therapy.) 
6. E.g., State v. John, 586 P.2d 410, 411-412 (Utah 1978) (holding that because expert testimony 
established that injuries were inflicted non-accidentally during a specific period of time, circumstan-
tial evidence that the defendant had exclusive custody during that period was suffucient to sus-
tain a conviction). In other cases, the defendant may not contest the obvious fact of exclusive 
control. E.g., State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 60 (Minn. 1981).The threshhold for sufficient 
evidence of exclusive control is higher when more adults have contact with the child, and when 
the timing of the injuries cannot be fixed with certainty. In addition, whenever the defendant 
is charged with a crime in which premeditation or intent to kill is an element, sufficient cir-
cumstantial evidence may be more difficult to obtain. See generally Evidentiary Problems, supra 
note 3, at 262. 
7. For example, in State v. John, 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 1978), the defendant contested his 
conviction for manslaughter of his 20 month old stepson on grounds that a conviction based 
on circumstantial evidence must exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, every other reasonable 
hypothesis. Id. at 41 I. The court held that the defendant's undisputed custody of the child dur-
ing a period of three and one half hours, and the expert witness's testimony that the injuries 
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Family courts 8 in civil proceedings have responded to this situation 
by relaxing some rules of evidence and creating a rebuttable presump-
tion of abuse in the face of certain kinds of injuries. 9 In civil child 
protection proceedings 10 the court determines whether a child is abused 
or neglected, 11 and if so, determines custody of the child. Because child 
protection proceedings are designed for the protection of children and 
impose no criminal penalties on parents,i 2 commentators generally ap-
prove of these evidentiary changes. 13 
had occurred during that time, were sufficient to permit a jury finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. at 412. Accord State v. Loss, 295 Minn. 271, 281-82, 204 N. W.2d 404, 409-10 (1973). 
8. The civil court empowered by statute to deal with family matters, especially child abuse 
and neglect, is called in some states the "family court," in others the "juvenile court." E.g., 
N.Y. Family Court Act, N.Y. JUD. LAW§ 2, 1011 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1982) (empowering 
family court to determine when the state may intervene to protect child); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 260.01, 260.111, 260.155, 260.191 (West 1982) (empowering juvenile court to adjudicate whether 
child abused or neglected and to order best disposition consistent with child's welfare); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 24A-301(a)(i)(4) (1981 & Supp. 1982) (granting juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction over 
"deprived" children). Jurisdiction does not extend to criminal prosecutions arising out of child 
abuse. This Note will refer to the civil court charged with abuse and neglect jurisdiction as the 
family court. 
9. E.g., In re S., 46 Misc. 2d 161, 162, 259 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Fam. Ct. 1965) ("borrowing 
from the evidentiary ... principle of "res ipsa loquitor" and accepting the proposition that 
the condition of the child speaks for itself, thus permitting an inference of neglect to be drawn 
from proof of the child's age and condition, and that the latter is such as in the ordinary course 
of things does not happen if the parent who has the responsibility and control of an infant 
is protective and non-abusive"). Several states have adopted this presumption by statute. E.g., 
N.Y. JuD. LAW § I046(a)(ii) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1982). See generally Fraser, supra note 
I, at 679-80; Principles, supra note 4; Evidentiary Problems, supra note 3, at 262-63. 
10. The Minnesota Juvenile Court Act is typical of state child protection legislation. MINN. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 260.01-260, 301 (West 1982). Any reputable person may file a petition directing 
the court to adjudicate the status of a child alleged to be neglected or dependent. Id. § 260. 13 I. 
Typically, such a. petition is filed by the state agency charged with investigating reported in-
cidents of abuse or neglect under the reporting statute, and with providing protective services. 
Id. § 626.556(3), (10). The statute then provides for a two-step hearing procedure. In phase 
one (adjudication), the juvenile court must determine whether the child in question meets the 
statutory definition of "dependent" or "neglected." Id. §§ 260.155(1), 260.015(6)(d) ("Depen-
dent child": without proper parental care because of emotional or mental disability or immaturity 
of parent); 260.015(10) ("Neglected child": without proper care because of faults or habits of parent 
or without necessary care due to parental neglect). If the court has found the child to be dependent 
or neglected, the court in phase two (disposition) enters whichever of several authorized orders-
will be in the child's "best interests." Id. § 260.19l(l)(a)-(c) (including home supervision and 
transfer of custody). In a separate proceeding, the juvenile court also is authorized to terminate 
parental rights on a showing of neglect or abuse that is likely to continue in the future to the 
permanent detriment of the child. Id. § 260.221(4). See generally I. SLOAN, supra note I, at 
18-22, 50-53, 75-76, 79-80, 127-35. 
11. For simplicity's sake, this Note will refer to all child maltreatment as "child abuse," 
and to all legal proceedings, civil and criminal, arising out of alleged abuse as "child abuse 
proceedings." When it is necessary to distinguish, civil proceedings will be designated "child 
protection proceedings," and criminal actions "child abuse prosecutions." 
12. See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text; Fraser, supra note I, at 670. 
13. E.g., Fraser, supra note I, at 679-80; Principles, supra note 4, at 342; Evidentiary Prob-
lems, supra, note 3, at 273; Evidence-Child Abuse, supra note 3, at 941-42. But see Note, 
Evidence, Child Abuse-Rule 404(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence: What Protection is 
Left After Grabill v. State, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 769, 783-85 (1981) (arguing against ad-
656 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 17:3 
The lack of eyewitness evidence is no less acute in criminal 
prosecutions 14 than in child protection proceedings, and proof that the 
parent caused the injuries inevitably must come from circumstantial 
evidence. 15 Accordingly, appellate courts generally refuse to reverse con-
victions for child homicide, even in the face of arguably prejudicial 
evidence, 16 where other substantial evidence supports the conviction. 11 
The difficulty of proving child abuse, combined with a perceived 
willingness of courts to admit otherwise excludable evidence, 18 has led 
some state prosecutors to attempt to introduce evidence that the def en-
dant parent possesses character traits identifying her with the "batter-
ing parent syndrome." 19 Such testimony is introduced to suggest that 
because this parent fits the psychological and demographic profile of 
typical abusing parents, she is more likely to be guilty of the particular 
acts of abuse charged. 20 Some courts have ruled such testimony inad-
missible as character evidence. 21 Yet the courts indicate that the bat-
tering parent syndrome may be admissible in future cases, given a show-
ing of sufficient scientific accuracy and predictive value. 22 Because of 
milting evidence of instances of past abusive conduct in a criminal proceeding) [hereinafter cited 
What Protection?]." 
14. The very proposition that the criminal law is a helpful aspect of the child protection 
system has been attacked, primarily on the ground that it may interfere with effective treatment, 
and thus impede the protective function of the child protection statutes. See e.g., DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, OFFICE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT: THE PROBLEM AND ITS MANAGEMENT, v.l, 29, 31-32 (DHEW Pub. No. 75-30073) (1975); 
Helfer, The Responsibility and Role of the Physician, in R. HELFER & C. KEMPE, THE BATTERED 
CHILD, 25, 33-36 (2d. Ed. 1974); Editor's Note, HELFER & KEMPE, at 186-87. But see Collins, 
The Role of the Law Enforcement Agency, in HELFER & KEMPE, at 179-186. 
Since the criminal law is less well-equipped than civil child protection statutes to provide contin-
uing protection of children, the entire case for criminal jurisdiction over abusing parents seems 
to rest on its deterrent function. The deterrence theory is deprived of some force, however, by 
the limited possibility of apprehension and prosecution for child abuse falling short of homicide, 
due to parental control over children. Therefore, many observers argue that criminal prosection 
of abusing parents ought to be limited to the most egregious cases of physical harm, primarily 
homicide. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT SERVICES, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT LITIGATION: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES, 142-46 (1981). 
15. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. See infra notes 26-39 and accompanying text. 
20. E.g., Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 18 (1983) (finding that the profile 
"could lead a reasonable juror to no other inference than that the state was implying that this 
parent had a history of violent behavior, and, more important, that this parent fit within the 
syndrome, and had in fact murdered her baby"). 
21. E.g., Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 18 (1983); State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 
58, 64 (Minn. 1981); see also FED. R. Evm. 404(a) ("Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion.); accord 50 MINN. STAT. ANN. Evm. (404)(a) (West 1980); 
cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-202 (1981) (The general character of the parties ... [is) irrelevant 
matter ... "). 
22. See State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d at 64 ("We feel this finding is required until further 
evidence of the scientific accuracy and reliability of syndrome or profile diagnosis can be 
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the syndrome's conflict with the character evidence rule, its future ad-
missibililty will require an explicit exception to that rule. Such an ex-
ception, although advancing the strong ·state policy of eradicating child 
abuse, 23 would infringe upon the competing interests of defendant 
parents in a fair adjudication. 24 The important family and societal in-
terests at stake whenever the state attempts to intervene in the parent-
child relationship call for scrupulous accuracy in decision-making. An 
exception to the character evidence rule for the battering parent syn-
drome would deprive parents of a protection against prejudicial decision-
making that the law considers significant enough to grant to all other 
defendants. 25 These overriding policies mandate that no such excep-
tion be created. · 
This Note proposes that courts refuse to give further consideration 
to admitting the battering parent syndrome as evidence in both civil 
and criminal proceedings arising out of child abuse. Part I of the Note 
describes the syndrome as it appears in the psychological literature. 
Part II suggests that current judicial attitudes favor the future ad-
missibility of the syndrome, conditioned only on an improved show-
ing of scientific accuracy. Part III demonstrates that regardless of scien-
tific accuracy, the character evidence rule forbids courts from admit-
ting the battering parent syndrome. Part IV argues that the important 
policies underlying the character evidence rule override the asserted 
need for an exception to that rule for the battering parent syndrome 
in child abuse proceedings. 
I. THE BATTERING PARENT SYNDROME: DEFINITION 
The battering parent syndrome does not appear in the medical 
literature as a diagnosable mental disorder. 26 Instead, a profile of 
psychological and demographic characteristics that many experts con-
sider typical of abusing parents emerges from numerous psychiatric 
established"); Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70,303 S.E.2d at 16 n.3 (expert "attempted no showing 
of [the profile's] scientific validity."); cf. Duley v. State, 56 Md. App. 275, 467 A.2d 776, 780 
(1983) (finding no showing of "how, when, or where the doctor ... acquired his expertise 
on the profile of the battered child's parent ... "). 
23. See infra notes 85-100 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 101-127 and accompanying text. While it may be argued that extensive 
state intervention interferes with a sort of parental "proprietary" right to discipline children 
however they see fit, this Note takes the position that the law protects no such right. Rather, 
parental "rights" are conceived of as necessary correlatives to parental "duties" adequately to 
care for their children; the rights terminate when the parent's abusive behavior violates those 
duties. See generally Fraser, The Child and His Parents: A Delicate Balance of Rights, in R. 
HELFER & C. KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY, 315 (1976); 
Note, Choosingfor Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Parents and the State, 
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 172-73 (1983); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES§§ 616-617. 
25. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
26. Unlike the battered child syndrome, which is a recognized medical diagnosis, see, e.g.,· 
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and psychological studies. The major characteristics that compose this 
profile are generally the same, 21 although the psychiatric and 
psychological studies which have isolated characteristics have used varied 
methodologies. 28 Thus, abusing parents seem to have low self esteem, 29 
poor impulse control, 30 low empathy, 31 low frustration tolerance, 32 and 
inadequate knowledge of basic child development and of parenting 
skills. 33 In addition, they are more likely than non-abusers to manifest 
Battered Child Syndrome, supra note I, the battering parent syndrome does not appear in the 
medical literature as such, although a number of studies are in agreement about characteristics 
of abusive parents. See infra notes 27-39. Similarly, the psychiatric profession does not recognize 
the battering parent syndrome as such. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC 
AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM Ill). 
27. Although testimony considered by courts contains no direct disagreement, it is apparent 
that experts draw their conclusions from personal clinical experience, as well as from the existing 
psychological literature. Variation exists in the factors which experts cite in their testimony. For 
example, in Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13 (1983) the expert described parents 
who abuse a child in a life-threatening fashion as parents who were abused as children, and 
who as adults suffer from chronic environmental stress. The parents' inability to cope with stress 
causes impulsive or explosive behavior. Id. at 16. In another case, testimony described characteristics 
of the abusing parent as including role reversal, low empathy, short fuse, low temper, short 
temper, low boiling point, high blood pressure, strict authoritarianism, uncommunicativeness, 
low self-esteem, isolation, lack of trust. State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 62-63 (Minn. 1981). 
The expert in the only other recent case to consider explicitly the battering parent profile in-
dicated that abusing parents: 
often are young, somewhat immature, unable to really handle their emotions in a socially 
acceptable fashion. Frequently they are in a stressful situation, either economic, [or) 
domestic stresses on them, and subject to sort of flying off when certain added stress 
is presented. They sometimes have been victims of quite harsh punishment themselves 
as they were growing up, ... a pattern which they fall back into. 
Duley v. State, 56 Md. App. 275, 467 A.2d 776, 779 (1983). 
28. The studies differ significantly in methodology. Several involve clinical observation of 
abusive parents, performed without the experimental controls necessary to generalize the results 
to all parents. See, e.g., Steele & Pollock, A Psychiatric Study of Parents Who Abuse Their 
Children, in HELFER & KEMPE, supra note 24, at 92-93. Clinical studies rely heavily on 
.psychoanalytic concepts which are not universally accepted among mental health professionals. 
Id. For several profiles of abusing parents drawn by clinicians, see generally D. Gil, supra note 
I, at 24-25. Even experimental studies use different definitions of child abuse and neglect or 
different standards for selecting abusing and "normal" parents. See Berger I, supra note 2, at 
55; D. GIL, supra note I, at 35, 134. Some studies assess parents' attitudes or personality through 
parents' responses to questions. See, e.g., Milner & Wimberly, Prediction and Explanation of 
Child Abuse, 36 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 875 (1980). This technique has been criticized by other 
researchers. See, e.g., Berger, The Child Abusing Family (Pt II), 8 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY, Winter 
1980, at 52, 63-65 [hereinafter cited as Berger II]. 
29. E.g., Friedrich & Wheeler, The Abusing Parent Revisited: A Decade of Psychological 
Research, 170 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 577,583 (1982) (summarizing the psychological 
literature on abusive parents since 1972) [hereinafter cited as Friedrich]; Berger, I, supra note 
2, at 58; Berger II, supra note 26, at 63 (noting that this characteristic has been found by the 
more methodologically sound studies). 
30. E.g., Berger I, supra note 2, at 58; Friedrich, supra note 29, at 583, 585. 
31. E.g., Berger II, supra note 28, at 63; Friedrich, supra note 29, at 583. 
32. E.g., Friedrich, supra note 29, at 582, 583, 585 (calling attention to a "stress-heightening 
attributional process," through which abusive parents are more easily irritated by child behaviors 
than non-abusers); B. STEELE, WORKING WITH ABUSIVE PARENTS FROM A PSYCHIATRIC POINT OF 
Vrnw, 26-27 (1975). 
33. E.g., Twentyman & Plotkin, Unrealistic Expectations of Parents Who Maltreat Their 
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diagnosable psychopathology, or other serious emotional problems. 34 
Apart from such personality characteristics, abusing parents in the 
reported studies were themselves almost universally abused or neglected 
as children. 35 As adults, they tend to social isolation, 36 and are likely 
to be under environmental stress, 37 often belonging to lower socio-
economic groups. 38 Finally, clinical studies agree that abusing parents, 
themselves emotionally starved for acceptance and affection, frequently 
reverse roles with their children, asking from them maturity and sup-
port that the children are incapable of providing. 39 
This profile, with minor variations, has been introduced as evidence 
in child abuse proceedings. Every court to consider the profile so far 
has rejected it. The uncertainty of these rejections, however, portends 
future admissibililty. 
II. CURRENT JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE BATTERING PARENT 
SYNDROME: THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE ADMISSIBILITY 
A profile of the typical abusing parent could be of great value to 
Children, 38 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 497, 501 (1982). Earlier studies were inconclusive on whether 
abusive parents actually had poorer knowledge of child development and parenting skills. See, 
e.g., Friedrich, supra note 29 at 579, 585. Abusing parents were thought to be more likely to 
have unrealistically high expectations for the physical and mental ages of their children. E.g., 
Steele & Pollock, supra note 28, at 96, (utilizing clinical observation of abusing parents). But 
see Kravitz and Driscoll, Expectations for Childhood Development among Child-Abusing and 
Non-Abusing Parents, 53 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 336 (1983) (finding no differences in expec-
tation between the two groups). Twentyman & Plotkin found that abusive parents were more 
likely both to over and underestimate their childrens' developmental capacities, suggesting that 
inadequate parental knowledge may be a better predictor of abusive behavior than high expecta-
tions, supra at 501-03. 
34. E.g., Berger I, supra note 2 at 57; Steele_& Pollock, supra note 28 at 94-97. 
35. E.g., Berger I, supra note 2, at 59-61; Friedrich, supra note 29, at 577-78; Jayartne, 
Child Abusers as Parents and Children: A Review, 22 SOCIAL WORK, 5 (1977); Steele & Pollock, 
supra note 28 at 97-98. While this cross-generational hypothesis that child abuse repeats itself 
has received much empirical support, most of the reviews note that disagreements over the definition 
of child abuse and other methodological concerns make such results suspect. Such results are 
also difficult to explain because of the absence of research support for a causal connection be-
tween childhood experience and adult behavior. Friedrich, supra note 29, at 579. Nevertheless, 
this characteristic is probably the best accepted of all in the literature on characteristics of abus-
ing parents. 
36: E.g., Friedrich, supra note 29, at 582-83. 
37. E.g., Friedrich, supra note 29, at 583-85; Conger, Burgess & Barrett, Child Abuse Related 
to Life Change and Perceptions of Illness, 28 FAMILY CooRDINATOR, 73 (1979); Justice & Dun-
can, Life Crisis as a Precursor to Child Abuse, 91 Pusuc HEALTH I JO (1976). 
38. E.g., D. GIL, supra note I, at 117; Serrano, Zuelzer, Howe & Reposa, Ecology of Abusive 
and Nonabusive Families, 2 ADVANCES FAMILY PSYCHIATRY 183 (1980). But see Steele & Pollock, 
supra note 28 at 92-93 (noting that abusers in their study came from all socioeconomic classes, 
but acknowledging that their haphazard selection process prevents this finding from rising to 
a level of reliable proof); Berger II, supra note 28, at 60-61 (noting that environmental stress 
frequently is confounded with low socioeconomic status in the studies, rendering unwarranted 
any conclusion regarding causation). 
39. E.g., Steele & Pollock, supra note 28 at 94-95; Kempe & Kempe, Assessing Family 
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the state in a child abuse proceeding. 4° For example, following expert 
presentation of the profile, a witness familiar with the defendant could 
testify that the def end ant posesses one or more of the characteristics 
identified by the expert. 4 1 Alternatively, the expert could off er an opin-
ion that the defendant "fit" the profile. In either event, the state would 
gain the significant advantage of suggesting that because of her 
psychological make-up, this defendant shows a statistical likelihood 
of being a child abuser. 42 
Courts justifiably have been troubled by the implications of permit-
ting use of the battering parent syndrome to prove child abuse, and 
to date, uniformly have forbidden its admission. Several reasons have 
been advanced for rejecting the syndrome, including general irrelevancy43 
and likelihood of prejudice outweighing probative value. 44 A plurality 
of opinions, however, exclude the battering parent syndrome for its 
conflict with the explicit dictates of the character evidence rule. 45 This 
common law rule, now adopted in the Federal Rules of Evidence, pro-
Pathology, in R. HELFER & C. KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUN-
ITY, 118-19 (1976). 
40. See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. Kempe & Kempe, Assessing Family Pathology, 
in R. HELFER & C. KEMPE, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY, 118-19 
(1976). 
41. E.g., State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 1981) (former case worker testifies 
that defendant was abused as a child and has a short temper). In one case, no corroborating 
witnesses were called, but the court held that it was error (though not reversible error) to permit 
the prosecutor to argue to the jury that the defendant fit the environmental stress component 
of the syndrome. Duley v. State, 56 Md. App. 275, 467 A.2d 776, 779-80 (1983). 
42. The studies described supra notes 26-39 compare the psychological profiles of known 
child abusers with non-abusing parents. The characteristics reported in those studies have been 
shown reliably to distinguish between those two groups. 
However, the mental health experts disagree about whether instruments developed through 
studies of known abusers can be reliably adapted for predictive use. One study reported very 
poor results from such an attempt. Milner & Ayoub, Evaluation of "At Risk" Parents Using 
the Child Abuse Potential Inventory, 36 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 945, 947 (1980) (using a diagnostic 
instrument that had discriminated reliably between known abusers and non-abusers in earlier 
research, the authors found that the instrument successfully classified only 45% of mothers judged 
"at-risk" by clinical observers). These results may be explained in part by the choice of "at 
risk" criteria, which included virtually every psychological characteristic found linked to child 
abuse in past research. Id. at 946. Different results might have been obtained with a smaller 
number of generally accepted characteristics of abusing parents. 
This Note assumes that the available psychological research, while not conclusive, provides 
sufficient information to permit a mental health professional reliably to identify a parent likely 
to neglect or abuse. This identification would be made on the basis of some combination of 
clinical observation, testing, and extrinsic evidence about life history, life circumstances (e.g., 
marital and socieoeconomic status) and behavior. Whether this type of identification is suffi-
ciently accurate to be admitted by courts is considered infra notes 55-67 and accompanying text. 
43. Duley v. State, 56 Md. App. 275, 467 A.2d 776, 780 (1983) (arguing that similarity to 
a psychological profile simply has no tendency to show the defendent's guilt for a particular crime). 
44. State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 667 P.2d 96, 99 (1983) (holding that the prejudicial 
impact of associating the defendant with a profile in a rape prosecution substantially outweighed 
any probative value of the evidence). 
45. Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 15 (1983); State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 
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hibits the state from raising the issue of the defendant's character to 
prove that she "acted in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion. " 46 Courts employing this analysis conclude that the batter-
ing parent syndrome could have no purpose or effect except to imply 
to the jury that the defendant possessed a propensity for child abuse, 
and therefore is more likely to have committed the particular abuse 
charged. 47 
Despite this apparent conflict with the explicit language of the 
character evidence rule, the courts have refused to foreclose future ad-
missibility of the battering parent syndrome. Indeed, the courts ap-
pear to be most troubled not by the character evidence rule's concern 
with unfair prejudice to the defendant, 48 but by their uncertainty about 
the scientific accuracy of the syndrome. A greater showing of scien-
tific accuracy and reliability of the syndrome, courts imply, will result 
in its acceptance in future cases. 49 The opinions relying on the character 
evidence rule seem almost to invite more extensive efforts by prosecutors 
to establish the scientific accuracy of the syndrome. 50 
Current judicial analysis of the evidentiary inadequacies of the bat-
tering parent syndrome thus provides at best uneasy protection for 
parents charged with child abuse. This refusal to shut the door to the 
battering parent syndrome appears especially troubling in light of courts' 
traditional liberalilty in ruling on admissibility of evidence in child abuse 
proceedings. 51 Likewise, in child protection proceedings, similar evidence 
on enumerated characteristics of a parent's mental state currently is 
58, 64 (Minn. 1981). Loebach distinguished two earlier Minnesota cases, State v. Loss, 295 Minn. 
271, 204 N.W.2d 404 (1973) (permitting evidence that defendant fit the battering parent syn-
drome when such evidence was offered without objection), and State v. Goblirsch, 309 Minn. 
401, 246 N.W.2d 12 (1976) (holding that admission of such evidence, not indispensible to the 
state's case, did not constitute reversible error). Despite their statements that the battering parent 
syndrome constitutes inadmissible character evidence, none of the courts considering such evidence 
(Duley, Sanders, Loebach, and Goblirsch) have found reversible error. 
46. FED. R. Evm. 404(a). 
47. Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E. 2d 13, 18 (1983) (finding that the profile "could 
lead a reasonable juror to no other inference than that the State was implying that this parent 
had a history of violent behavior, and, more important, that this parent fit within the syndrome, 
and had in fact murdered her baby"); State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn. 1982) ("The 
obvious purpose for the introduction of the ... character evidence was to demonstrate that 
appellant fit within the 'battering parent' profile"); cf. State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 
667 P.2d 96, 99 (1983). While basing its holding on the likelihood that testimony on the 
characteristics of statutory rape offenders would be more prejudicial than probative, the court 
explained its reasoning in terms of propensity evidence concerns. "Such evidence invites a jury 
to conclude that because the defendant has been identified ... as a member of a group having 
a higher incidence of child sexual abuse, it is more likely that the defendant committed the crime." 
48. See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
49. See supra note 22. 
50. E.g., Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 16 n.3, 18 n.7 (noting specifically 
that the issue of scientific accuracy was not decided because no attempt had been made to establish 
accuracy). 
51. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. 
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admissible in the adjudication phase. 52 Exclusion of the battering parent 
syndrome flows against this tide. Such exclusion will continue only 
if courts express more clearly and with greater certainty the reasons 
for the exclusion. This Note suggests a framework for continued ex-
clusion, arguing that both existing rules of evidence and overriding 
policy considerations preclude admissibililty. 
Ill. INADMISSIBILILTY OF THE BATTERING PARENT SYNDROME 
UNDER EXISTING RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Admission of testimony concerning the battering parent syndrome 
presents at least two evidentiary problems; the quality of the scientific 
support for the syndrome and the conflict with the character evidence 
rule. Part A of this Section measures the syndrome's scientific accuracy 
against the general requirements for relevancy of expert testimony, and 
concludes that the unique nature of the psychological profile prevents 
the syndrome from qualifying as relevant evidence. Part B argues that 
even if the syndrome is thought to be relevant, the character evidence 
rule still prohibits its admissibility. 
A. Relevancy 
The modern trend in determining whether evidence is relevant, and 
therefore admissible, 53 is to set a very low threshhold. The Federal Rules 
define as relevant evidence "having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 54 
52. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.015(6) (10) (West 1982) (defining "Dependent Child" 
with regard to the "emotional, mental, or physical disability, or state of immaturity of his parent 
... " (6); and "Neglected Child" as a child "without proper parental care because of the faults 
or habits of his parent ... " (10)). While a broad reading of these mental characteristics could 
permit evidence of the battering parent syndrome as an "emotional" or "mental disability," 
it should be clear that the syndrome is not itself a disability, but rather a description of several 
mental traits, only some of which are themselves disabilities. See supra notes 26-39 and accom-
panying text. While most states permit court-ordered psychological examination of a parent in 
evidence at the dispositional phase of a child protection proceeding, some states permit such 
evidence at the adjudicatory phase. See Fraser, supra note 1, at 669-70 (1978). A forced ex-
amination is tantamount to forcing a parent to testify against himself. Id. at 670. While this 
may present no constitutional problems, since the proceedings are not criminal, loss of custody 
of a child surely has a punitive dimension. Id. at 670 n.183. See also infra notes 114-117 and 
accompanying text. To the extent that any such psychological testimony suggests a propensity 
for abuse or neglect it necessarily relies on existing battering parent profiles. 
53. E.g., FED. R. Evm. 402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible"); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. RULE 402 (West 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-201 (5744) (1981) ("[E]vidence must 
relate to the questions being tried by the jury and bear upon them either directly or indirectly. 
Irrelevant matter should be excluded."). 
54. FED. R. Evm. 401. 
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If possession of a number of characteristics shared by most abusing 
parents makes it more probable that the possessor is herself an abus-
ing parent, the battering parent syndrome would satisfy this threshhold 
requirement. 
The answer to this inquiry depends upon the scientific community's 
acceptance of the battering parent syndrome. The decision to admit 
any expert testimony is made by the trial judge, 55 based on evidence 
that the testimony reflects a position which is "generally accepted" 
in the relevant scientific community. Appellate courts have limited their 
review of decisions to admit or exclude expert testimony to this require-
ment of general acceptance. 56 As illustrated in Section I of this Note, 
researchers have accumulated sufficient evidence to show broad agree-
ment on a number of characteristics composing the battering parent 
syndrome. 
Even if it meets the "general acceptance" criteria of the expert 
testimony requirement, however, the battering parent syndrome will 
still be inadmissible unless those agreed-upon characteristics tend mean-
ingfully to show that this particular defendant committed the acts 
charged. 57 In fact, the syndrome does no more than establish that when 
known child abusers are compared with non-abusing parents, members 
of the former group more frequently exhibit certain psychological traits 
and demographic characteristics than members of the latter. 58 Com-
pared with the general population of parents, then, parents exhibiting 
the battering parent syndrome are statistically more likely to be child 
abusers. The question is whether such a statistical correlation renders 
the parent's guilt "more probable ... than it would be without the 
evidence." 
55. E.g., FED. R. Evm. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified 
as an expert ... may testify thereto ... "); U.S. v. Gavic, 520 F.2d 1346, 1353 (8th Cir. 1975) 
("[A]dmissibility of expert testimony lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge."); Duley 
v. State, 56 Md. App. 275, 467 A.2d 776, 780 (1983). 
56. In Sanders, the court explicitly noted that the clinical psychologist's testimony about the 
features of the battering parent syndrome lacked a showing of "scientific validity." Sanders 
v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 16 n.3 (1983). The court seems to be referring to 
the common law requirement that expert testimony may be admitted only if the scientific princi-
ple has "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Frye v. United 
States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye continues to be cited as good law, e.g., State 
v. Collins, 296 Md. 670, 464 A.2d 1028, 1033-34 (1983) (holding that the use of hypnosis to 
refresh witnesses' memories lacks reliabilit.y judged by the standards of :he rel"!vant scientific 
community, and noting that Frye still constitutes the majority rule); United States v. Lewellyn, 
723 F.2d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that defendant failed to make a prima facie showing 
of insanity because he failed "to demonstrate that there is general acceptance in the fields of 
psychiatry and psychology of the principle that some pathological gamblers lack substantial capacity 
to conform their conduct to the requirements of laws ... "). The language of the new federal 
rule appears broader, permitting experts to base opinion upon facts or data "reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field." FED. R. Evm. 703. 
57. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
58. See supra note 42. 
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In a very crude sense, the answer to this inquiry might appear to 
be yes. The law frequently permits proof of causation by a showing 
of statistical likelihood, as when an expert testifies that a construction 
worker has contracted cancer from working with asbestos. The defen-
dant is free to propose other ex"planations, or to attack the statistical 
foundation of the conclusion, but the evidence is admissible because 
it makes the theory of causation more probable than it would be without 
the doctor's testimony. 59 
In contrast, it is not clear that the correlation between psychological 
characteristics and abuse represented by the battering parent syndrome 
actually tends to show a propensity for abuse in this parent. The law 
traditionally has taken a skeptical view of the value of psychological 
profile evidence, admitting it for only limited purposes. 60 Some com-
mentators suggest that the psychologist's ability to predict behavior 
accurately on the basis of even accepted diagnoses is so primitive that 
all psychological testimony should be excluded from courts. 61 Accord-
ingly, absent a statutory mandate, 62 courts have limited the admission 
of testimony on the mental state of a party largely to child custody 
59. Such evidence, however, may not be sufficient to support a finding of liability. See generally 
R. LEMPERT & s. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE, 152-54 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter 
cited as LEMPERT & SALTZBURG). Evidence is not excludable on relevancy grounds merely because 
standing alone it would be insufficient to support a verdict. If the state's case is thought of 
as a "wall," each piece of evidence is a "brick" necessary to the construction of the wall. Id. 
at 151-52. 
60. Commentators have argued, without much success, for expansion of the role of profile 
evidence, especially in civil cases. See, e.g., McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
§ 189 (E. Cleary ed. 1972) (suggesting that prohibition of evidence of "accident proneness" on 
the issue of auto negligence has a doubtful connection to the character evidence rule, and sug-
gesting that courts keep abreast of the changing state of the art of this sort of prediction) [hereinafter 
cited as McCORMICK]; Maloney & Reish, The Accident-Prone Driver: The Automobile Ages Big-
gest Unsolved Problem, 14 U. FLA. L. REv. 364, 381-382 (1962) (suggesting that a profile of 
habits, psychomotor characteristics and mental characteristics might be a valid basis for restricted 
issuance of licenses). McCormick reports that as of 1978, no court had accepted such evidence 
in a negligence suit. McCORMICK§ 189 (Supp. 1978). See also Note, The Medical Practice Com-
puter Profile: Proof of the Doctor's Actions in a Series of Similar Cases, 7 U.C.D. L. REV. 
523, 527 (1974) (arguing for admissiblity in a medical malpractice action of a computer com-
posite of a doctor's records as proof of the quality of care he generally provides). But see Johnson 
v. Myers, 118 Ga. App. 773, 165 S.E.2d 739 (1968) (rejecting such evidence). 
61. See generally Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping 
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 693, 735-39 (1974). But see Litwack, Gerber & Fenster, 
The Proper Role of Psychology in Child Custody Disputes, 18 J. FAM. L. 269, 282-93 (1979) 
(arguing that despite the difficulties with psychiatric diagnosis, psychologists and psychiatrists 
may perform several valuable functions for a court, including discovering and analyzing parent 
attitudes and behaviors relevant to a custody disposition).For an engaging fictional speculation 
on the potential for psychology accurately to predict human behavior, see generally I. ASIMOV, 
FOUNDATION (1951). 
62. For example, some state statutes require an estimation of the "dangerousness" of a party 
in a proceeding for civil commitment or criminal sentencing. See generally Mullen & Reinehr, 
Predicting Dangerousness of Maximum Security Forensic Mental Patients, IO J. PSYCHIATRY 
L. 223, 228 (1982) (reporting poor correlations of both psychological tests and demographic data 
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disputes63 and criminal defenses. 64 This restricted admission of testimony 
on mental state reflects the law's compromise with the necessity of 
obtaining some knowledge, however imperfect, in order to determine 
the best placement for the child or the mens rea of an accused. The 
necessity that moves courts to depart from the general practice of 
precluding psychological testimony is absent in situations in which the 
court might be asked to admit testimony about the battering parent 
syndrome. Psychological testimony is at its strongest when used to prove 
or disprove insanity, since it is limited to showing merely that the defen-
dant possesses certain thinking processes. A court cannot determine the 
culpabililty of a criminal defendant claiming insanity without hearing 
opinions on whether the defendant's psychological profile fits that 
generally associated with a mental disorder. In contrast, a court need 
not examine the psychological characteristics of a parent to make the 
with expert estimates of "dangerousness"); Steadman, Some Evidence on the Inadequacy 
·of the Concept and Determination of Dangerousness in Law and Psychiatry, I J. PSYCHIATRY 
L. 409,421 (1973) (concluding that the·N.Y. statute had led to psychiatric conclusions and recom-
mendations based on the charges levelled rather than on any additional evidence of dangerous 
behavior). While the criticisms levelled by both articles may be justified, they are inapplicable 
to the use of the battering parent syndrome. First, sentencing of criminals occurs only after 
conviction, and thus bears analogy to the dispositional phase of a child protection proceeding. 
At that point, whatever predictions of future behavior are available, even if only minimally reliable, 
• will support the important policy of protecting the child (or the public). Second, the use of 
psychiatric testimony in both sentencing of a criminal and placement of an abused child does 
not conflict with the prohibitions of the character evidence rule, because the rule does not apply 
when character is an "essential element" of the issue before the court. FED. R. Evm. 404(a), 
advisory committee note. 
63. Once a child has been adjudicated "abused" or "neglected," the court has no alternative 
but to consider which parent, if either, should have custody. Even if most child custody statutes 
did not mandate consideration of parental fitness, see supra note 10, it is difficult to imagine 
how a judge would determine which placement would be in the "best interests" of the child 
without it. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN§§ 257.025, 260.011 (West, 1978) (requiring the family 
court to order placement of children in accord with "best interests" or "spiritual [and) emo-
tional ... welfare," in any custody proceeding or abuse and neglect disposition). Nonetheless, 
with a few exceptions, states have carefully limited the use of a psychological study of the parent's 
propensity for future abuse to the disposition of a custody dispute, when the issue of parental 
fitness is unavoidably before the court. See Fraser, supra note I, at 669-70. 
64. The psychological profile of a criminal defendant becomes essential once the defendant 
has raised the defense of insanity. Yet even in this well-recognized area, skepticism about the 
validity of psychiatry and psychology creates constant pressure to eliminate or modify the defense. 
See generally Project, Evaluating Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 
16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 77 (1982). In addition, courts have been wary of expanding the justifica-
tion of self-defense to include proof by psychological profile that a woman charged with killing 
her husband was a victim of the battered woman syndrome. E.g., State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio 
St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1981) (rejecting such evidence in part for failure to show 
general acceptance by the relevant scientific community); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378 
(Wyo. 1981). Cf. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 640 (D.C. 1979) (remanding for 
determination of whether the battered woman syndrome meets the general acceptance standard); 
Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 415 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 
1982) (remanding for same). But see State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 775-76, 424 A.2d 171, 172-73 
(1980) (permitting such evidence). 
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factual determination of whether she did, or did not, abuse her child. 65 
Possession of the psychological characteristics of the battering parent 
syndrome is relevant only insofar as it suggests the parent's propensity 
to behave in an abusive way, a conclusion that must rest on psychology's 
predictive rather than descriptive value. 66 
Courts take the position that the uncertainty that characterizes 
psychology's abililty to predict behavior warrants concluding that 
psychological profiles do not make the existence of the "fact" of 
behavior "more probable ... than it would be without the evidence. " 61 
Absent an overriding necessity such as the determination of insanity, 
courts should follow this general pattern by excluding the battering 
parent syndrome on this ground of irrelevancy. 
B. Character Evidence 
Even if courts conclude that the general scientific acceptance of its 
components renders the statistical likelihood suggested by the batter-. 
ing parent syndrome sufficiently relevant to warrant admissibility, the 
syndrome must nevertheless be excluded because of its conflict with 
the character evidence rule. 6: 
The traditional and modern rules of evidence squarely support the 
conclusion that the battering parent syndrome, as established by ex-
pert and corroborative testimony, constitutes character evidence. 69 
Wigmore-described character as "a person's disposition - i.e. a trait, 
65. With limited statutory exceptions, such an inquiry is precluded until the dispositional 
phase of a child protection proceeding. See infra notes 120-122 and accompanying text. 
66. Cf. supra notes 42, 61. Child custody determinations rely on exactly this predictive func-
tion, but are justified in such reliance by a statutory scheme that requires an initial determination 
that abuse has occurred, before attempting to predict the best placement for the child. E.g. MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 260.191 (West 1980). Once the fact of abuse has been determined, the law has 
a strong interest in securing a safe placement for the child. To this end, courts are empowered 
to consider otherwise inadmissible information at the dispositional hearing, since the need for 
some means of predicting outweighs the questionable quality of such predictions. E.g., MINN. 
STAT. ANN.§ 260.181(2) (West 1980) (permitting court to consider "any other information deemed 
material"). 
67. FED. R. Evm. 401. 
68. See supra note 21. 
69. Id. None of the reported cases have considered whether an expert would be permitted 
to examine the defendant and make a "diagnosis" that she was afflicted with the battering parent 
syndrome, or otherwise offer an opinion that this parent has a propensity to abuse. If the American 
Psychiatric Association were to determine that the battering parent syndrome were a medically 
diagnosible condition, and to add the syndrome to DSM-III, supra note 26, courts would be 
presented with a very different question. At that point, the expert's opinion would resemble 
a typical psychiatric opinion on mental capacity. Nevertheless, if offered for the purpose of showing 
that because her mental condition included a propensity to abuse, the defendant had in fact 
committed the abuse charged, the character evidence objection would still exist. While recogniz-
ing that a "diagnosis" of battering parent syndrome would present a much clearer conflict be-
tween the character evidence rule and the judge's normal discretion to admit expert testimony, 
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or group of traits, or the sum of his traits." 10 Such evidence may not 
be used to prove liability for a particular act by suggesting the def en-
dant' s general propensity to commit such an act. 11 The battering parent 
syndrome fits this definition of character evidence. When the state at-
tempts to show that the parent resembles the expert witness's portrait 
of character traits by calling lay witnesses, the testimony of such 
witnesses always describes particular traits. For example, in one case, 
the state called witnesses who testified that as an adolescent, the def en-
dant had exhibited poor control of his temper, social isolation and 
low tolerance for frustration, 12 three of the characteristics of the bat-
tering parent profile. 73 Without testimony that the defendant possesses 
those traits that comprise the syndrome, testimony on the traits 
themselves would be irrelevant. Since it is only by suggesting the im-
permissible inference of guilt by propensity that the syndrome has any 
relevance, it plainly conflicts with the character evidence rule. 
Evidence of propensity is relevant to the likelihood of the defen-
dant's guilt or liability for particular acts, 74 as subsequent courts, 
Wigmore, and other commentators universally acknowledge. They also 
agree, however, that the possibility of a jury finding guilt or liability 
based on the belief that the defendant is a "bad" or "undesirable" 
person, rather than on proof that she committed the particular acts 
charged, requires a per se exclusion of all such evidence. 15 This con-
see supra note 53, this Note assumes that such a "diagnosis" standing alone should likewise 
be excluded as "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character." FED. R. Evro. 404(a). 
70. IA J. WJGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 52 (Tillers rev. 1983) [hereinafter 
cited as WIGMORE]. 
71. E.g., FED. R. Evm. 404(a). 
72. State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 62 (Minn. 1981). 
73. See supra notes 30, 32, 36. 
74. Evidence of propensity would not necessarily be sufficient to support a finding of guilt 
or liability. See supra note 59. 
75. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 70, §§ 55, 57; McCORMICK supra note 60, at§§ 188, 190. 
The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said 
to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudice one with 
a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular 
charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative 
value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of 
issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice. 
Michelson v. United States 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948). But see Lempert and Saltzburg, who 
argue that guilty defendants with past records are likely to plea bargain to avoid trial, due to 
the variety of exceptions to the character evidence rule permitted for past bad acts; that defen-
dants with past records who do go to trial are more likely to be innocent; and that police work 
is organized so that persons mistakenly charged are likely to have criminal records. LEMPERT 
& SALTZBURG, supra note 59, at 217 n.45, 237. This argument has some force in the child abuse 
area, since abusive parents, while unlikely to have prior convictions for child abuse crimes (if 
they still have custody of children), may have past records with child welfare departments which 
may be admissible to show motive, intent, modus operandi, or for other non-propensity pur-
poses. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 404(b) (West 1978). See infra note 94. For example, if 
a jury were to find a defendant guilty of child abuse because of his reputation as an alcoholic, 
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cern for the danger of unfair prejudice provides the theoretical foun-
dation for the character evidence rule. Prejudice has been defined as 
"harm which results when evidence is inappropriately influential because 
it appeals to the biases or emotions of the fact finder. " 16 Thus, evidence 
of past episodes of child abuse is logically relevant to the issue of whether 
the defendant has been abusive on this occasion. Yet such evidence 
is excluded because the fact finder is likely to conclude that one abuser 
is like another, and to find liability regardless of whether the evidence 
warrants such a determination this time. 11 
The possibility of such prejudice is extremely high when a parent 
is accused of causing harm to her own child, due to universal revul-
sion at the heinous nature of the offense. Instead of finding guilt based 
on their feeling that a person with the defendant's other bad habits 
is also a likely child abuser, the jury might reach a conclusion of guilt7 8 
from the defendant's apparent similarity to other abusing parents. In 
both cases, the character evidence rule operates to prevent such a con-
clusion of guilt based on the defendant's alleged propensity for bad 
behavior. 
The character evidence rule seems unequivocally to exclude the bat-
tering parent syndrome from evidence. Nonetheless, the courts appear 
to rest exclusion only weakly on that foundation, by intimating that 
a showing of its scientific accuracy might render the syndrome 
admissible. 79 Since they cannot mean that scientifically accurate expert 
testimony is exempted from the character evidence rule, so the courts 
must be saying that if convinced of the ability of the battering parent 
syndrome to identify accurately abusing parents, they would consider 
fashioning an exception to the rule. 81 
The immediate problem presented by this approach is that it con-
they would meet this test of prejudice because the information on reputation "appeals to the 
biases or emotions of the fact-finder." LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 59, at 156. 
76. LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 59, at 156. 
77. Another statement of the issue is that a jury is less likely to feel regret at mistakenly 
convicting an apparently unsavory defendant, so that they will scrutinize evidence far less carefully 
for an "evil" than a "good" person. Lempert and Saltzburg describe this tendency in terms 
of the mathematical model of a "regret matrix." LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 59, at 162-65. 
78. The same danger may attach to the parent of a child whose status is being adjudicated 
by a judge in a child protection proceeding. See infra notes 114-117 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra note 22. 
80. Despite the logical relevance of propensity evidence, the law classifies it as legally irrele-
vant. In the federal rules, this is accomplished by the inclusion of the character evidence rule 
in the relevancy chapter. FED. R. Evrn. 404. The common law was more likely to state irrelevance 
directly. See, e.g., GA. CooE ANN. § 38-202 (1981 Rev.) ("The general character of the parties, 
and especially their conduct in other transactions, are irrelevant matter ... "). See generally 
LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 59, at 152-55. Thus, Rule 404 and the other relevancy rules 
control admissibility of all evidence, including testimony by experts. E.g., FED. R. Evrn. 702. 
81. Otherwise, the language, "We feel this finding is required until further evidence of the 
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flicts with the fundamental purpose of the character evidence rule, which 
is concerned not with accuracy, but with prejudice. Increased scien-
tific accuracy does not lessen the likelihood that a jury will convict 
based on an impermissible inferenc~ that because of. her propensity, 
the defendant must have committed the act charged. In effect, an ex-
ception to the character evidence rule for the battering parent syndrome 
would determine that parents of allegedly abused children are not en-
titled to the same protection from jury prejudice as the law affords 
other defendants. Assuming such a determination to be permissible, 82 
it would give undue weight to the public policy of preventing child 
abuse83 at the expense of the rights of defendants. 84 
IV. COMPETING POLICIES: ANOTHER DETERRENT To CHILD ABUSE 
OR THE PROTECTION OF FAIR ADJUDICATIONS? 
Policy considerations supporting the interest of parents in an op-
portunity to def end adequately against a charge of child abuse argue 
against an exception to the character evidence rule for the battering 
parent syndrome. Part A of this final section examines the strong public 
policy in favor of eradicating child abuse in the context of the several 
exceptions to the traditional rules of evidence that the law has developed 
in support of that policy. Part B argues that notwithstanding this ad-
mittedly powerful interest, permitting the battering parent syndrome 
to override the character evidence rule in criminal cases would conflict 
with the defendant parent's right to an adjudication of individual guilt. 
This part further suggests that the quasi-criminal character of civil child 
abuse adjudications likewise calls for exclusion of the battering parent 
syndrome, and concludes that even in the absence of any due process 
"right," the danger of a prejudicial decision should be sufficient to 
bar the syndrome from evidence. 
scientific accuracy and reliability of syndrome or profile diagnoses can be established," would 
be meaningless. State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981). See also Sanders v. State, 
251 Ga. 70, 302 S.E.2d 13, 16 n.3, 17 n.4, 18 n.7 (1983); Duley v. State, 56 Md. App. 275, 
279, 467 A.2d 776, 780 (1983). 
82. It may be argued, especially in jurisdictions with codified rules of evidence, that any 
judge-made exception to the character evidence rule would be usurpation of a legislative func-
tion. This argument fails to account for other judge-made evidence exceptions, such as the adop-
tion from tort law of a rebuttable presumption of abuse in the presence of certain injuries. See 
supra note 9; see also Principles, supra note 4. In addition, the activity of legislatures in the 
area might imply either a desire to provide comprehensive statutory control over evidence in 
child abuse cases, or legislative intent to facilitate prosecution of such cases. See infra. notes 
120-122 and accompanying text. 
83. See infra notes 85-96 and accompanying text. 
84. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. See infra notes 101-113 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Compelling Nature of the Public Policy of 
Eradicating Child Abuse 
It seems almost unnecessary to argue that American society supports 
a strong public policy aimed at the prevention of child abuse, even 
at the cost of parental "rights" and family "privacy." The law tradi-
tionally has declined to intervene in the private realm of family affairs, 85 
and even protects many personal decisions about family life from the 
paternalistic hand of the state's police power. 86 The cases of the United 
States Supreme Court abound with statements supporting the rights 
of parents to raise their children free from state regulation, 87 and our 
85. For example, other than prescribing the rules of who may marry and under what cir-
cumstances parties may end their marriage, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, §§ 
201,203,204,205,207,208 and commissioner's prefatory note (1970), the law has abstained from 
tinkering with the terms of the marriage contract; accordingly courts generally have declined to 
enforce ante-nuptial agreements between the parties. E.g., Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885 (Ala. 
1959) (refusing to enforce such an agreement in parental dispute about where a child should be 
educated). But see Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962) (enforcing a reasonable 
ante-nuptial agreement, made after full disclosur~ and limited to financial matters). In addition, 
the common law declined to punish the husband for the "moderate correction" of his wife', though 
concededly such conduct would have constituted a battery between non-family members. E.g., State 
v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 349,251 Terr. 454,456 (1868) (concluding that "family government is recognized 
by Jaw as being as complete itself as the State government is in itself ... and that we will not 
interfere or attempt to control it"). The law may seem inconsistent in prohibiting the parties from 
exercising family autonomy in designing the terms of their marriage agreement, yet recognizing 
"family autonomy" as a general principle excluding the law from family matters. This seeming 
inconsistency may be explained by the legal fiction that family harmony will best be preserved 
by removing the possibility of any litigation over most family disagreements. 
86. Many of these principles may be summarized under the right of privacy, which prohibits 
the state from most regulation of "personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit 
in the concept of ordered liberty' ... ," Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). While the 
parameters of the right of privacy are unclear, the Supreme Court has prohibited the states from: 
(I) making illegal the sale and use of contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
484-85 (1964); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1971); (2) requiring that all children 
attend public schools, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1924) (permitting parents 
to send their children to Catholic schools); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234-35 (1971) 
(upholding the right of Amish parents, on religious and cultural grounds, to withdraw their children 
from public schools prior to the minimum dropout age); and (3) zoning a neighborhood to pro-
hibit an extended family from living together, Moore v. East Clevelan.d, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 
(1976). See generally, Note, Fornication, Cohabitation and the Constitution, or Lochner Redivivus, 
77 MICH. L. REv. 252 (1978) (searching for the boundaries of the right of privacy). 
87. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-233 (1971) ("The history and culture of 
Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing 
of their children .... [Pierce] stands as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious 
upbringing of their children."); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1924) (upholding 
"the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under 
their control .... The child is not the mere creature of the State."); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 400 ("corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to 
give his children education suitable to their station in life"); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158, 166 (1943) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside 
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations 
the state can neither supply nor hinder ... [respecting] the private realm of family life which 
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society generally accepts the physical disciplining of children as a cor-
ollary freedom. 88 
Against this background, the scope of intervention into the family 
authorized, 89 indeed required, 90 by state child protection statutes stands 
in bright contrast. The vague standards for such intervention seem even 
more remarkable. 91 The unique defenselessness of abused or neglected 
children, whose presumed protectors are also perpetrators of harm, 
has led even the federal government to appropriate funds for research 
and the improvement of child protective services. 92 State legislatures 
and courts have also attacked the problem by relaxing the rules of 
evidence, lightening the state's burden of proof, especially in civil, but 
also in criminal, proceedings. 93 
More important as expressions of judicial policy, however, have been 
the courts' extremely liberal interpretations of the existing exceptions 
to the character evidence rule in child abuse prosecutions. Citing the 
rule that evidence implicating character may be admitted to prove issues 
other than propensity, courts have consistently refused to reverse con-
victions where the small probative value of character evidence to show, 
for example, intent, seemed substantially outweighed by the possibil-
the state cannot enter.") Indeed, courts have declined to order life-saving corrective surgery for 
a child over parental objection. E.g., In Re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 92 Cal. App. 3d, 
796 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980). 
88. See, e.g., D. GIL, supra note I, at 8-17, 134-37. 
89. See supra note 10. 
90. See supra note I. 
91. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.01 I (West 1978); see also supra note 10. 
92. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 5101 (1982)). 
93. In the adjudication (fact-finding) phase of civil abuse and neglect proceedings, the New 
York legislature has taken the lead in lightening the state's burden via the evidence provisions 
of the New York Family Court Act of 1962 and its amendments. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT, § 1046 
(McKinney 1983). The act makes admissible past acts of parental abuse involving different children, 
Id., § 1046(a)(i), and any mandatorily-reported past incident of abuse by the parent on file with 
the state's central registry, Id. § 1046(a)(v), although both of these provisions would otherwise 
conflict with the character evidence rule. Indeed, the practice commentary to the Act states that 
character and background evidence is an "inextricable element in the proof" of a child abuse 
adjudication. Id. § 1044 Practice Commentary. Hearsay statements of the child are also permit-
ted, Id. § 1046(a)(vi). The Act also codifies a rebuttable presumption of abuse on the basis of 
physical injuries such as "would not ordinarily· be sustained or exist except by reason of the 
acts or omissions of the parent," id. § 1046(a)(ii), and makes evidence of drug or alcohol abuse 
by the parent prima facie evidence of neglect, id. § 1046(a)(iii). 
In the absence of codification, courts in other states have adopted one or more of the above 
approaches, especially permitting the physical injuries described by the battered child syndrome 
to create a prima facie case of abuse which the parent must then rebut. E.g., In Re Doege, 
308 Minn. 104, 240 N.W.2d 562 (1976); Higgins v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 544 S.W.2d 
745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). In addition, courts have liberally construed the parental unfitness 
aspects of some child neglect definitions, e.g., In re Wachlin's 245 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1976) 
(finding statutory "neglect" based on the parent's failure to cooperate to provide her child with 
speech therapy); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015(10) (West 1982). 
In homicide prosecutions arising out of parental abuse, courts have liberally construed rules 
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ity that the jury would use the evidence as proof of propensity. 94 In 
one case, for instance, the court permitted the prosecution to show 
that the defendant had previously burned and beaten his child, resting 
admissibility of the past acts of abuse on the grounds that they showed 
the defendants "intent" and "design" to commit manslaughter of his 
infant son. 95 The defense claimed that the danger of a jury reacting 
prejudicially to such evidence and convicting on the basis of their emo-
tional disgust with the def end ant substantially outweighed any pro-
bative value of the evidence on the permissible issue of intent. The 
court dismissed this objection, citing seriatum the 404(b) exceptions 
to the character evidence rule as authority for the proposition that the 
previous acts were admissible to show the defendant's "predisposition" 
to commit the crime charged. 96 
Strong judicial language explicitly disallowing the battering parent 
syndrome must thus be read in the light of this more general judicial 
policy. Despite their current exclusion of the battering parent syndrome, 
courts seem generally to view the concern for arresting child abuse as 
more compelling than the prohibitions of the character evidence rule. 97 
True, so far this policy has been implemented largely by discretionary 
requiring that convictions based upon entirely circumstantial evidence must exclude "every other 
reasonable hypothesis." See supra note 8. 
94. While character evidence is inadmissible to prove propensity, the law traditionally has 
permitted evidence of a party's past bad acts to prove matters other than propensity. E.g. FED. 
R. Evrn. 404(b): 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of 
a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, 
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, prepara-
tion, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
The comment to that rule notes that such an admission may be made only after meeting the 
overriding test of rule 403, that its "probative value is [not] substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice." FED. R. Evrn. 403, 404(b), advisory committee's note. 
95. State v. Vega, 40 N.C. App. 326, 253 S.E.2d 94, appeal dismissed, 297 N.C. 457, 256 
S.E.2d 809, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 968 (1979). 
96. State v. Vega, 40 N.C. App. 326, 253 S.E.2d 94, 97, appeal dismissed, 297 N.C. 457, 
256 S.E.2d 809, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 968 (1979). Cf. Schleret v. State, 311 N.W.2d 843, 845 
(Minn. 1981) (permitting testimony of prior beatings as "background," over a dissent arguing 
that this is essentially battering parent syndrome evidence and ought to be excluded under Loebach, 
310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1981)); People v. Aeschlimann, 28 Cal. App. 3d 460, 473, 104 Cal. Rptr. 
689, 697 (1972) (admitting testimony of prior abuse supporting a second degree murder convic-
tion by asserting that the testimony was evidence of the same crime because the crime charged 
included "a course of conduct of inflicting grievous pain and suffering"). 
97. Two reasons suggest themselves as explanations for courts' seeming inconsistency regard-
ing admission of these two types of propensity evidence (the battering parent syndrome and past 
acts of child abuse). First, courts may be wary of directly usurping the legislative function of 
prescribing the rules of evidence. Admitting evidence of previous conduct may fit, however un-
comfortably, into one of the explicit exceptions to the character evidence rule, such as proof 
of "motive," "intent," or "design." See supra note 94. Admitting evidence of the battering 
parent syndrome, on the other hand, would require an explicit exception to the rule. Further, 
child abuse and neglect is not an area of legislative inaction, so any judicial act to create an 
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interpretation of the codified exceptions to the rule, 98 and courts have 
not attacked the rule directly. 99 Yet they also have intimated that the 
rule may have limits: that science may some day replace character as 
the active ingredient in the battering parent syndrome, thus rendering 
it palatable to the judicial appetite. 100 
Plainly, the law supports an unusually strong policy in favor of 
eliminating child abuse and neglect. By necessity, the law of evidence 
has responded to this policy by creating several exceptions aimed at 
easing the state's evidentiary burden. To the extent that these excep-
tions aid in the protection of children without undermining the integrity 
of the adjudicatory process itself, they are to be welcomed. The eviden-
tiary problems of child abuse, however, do not justify eliminating those 
procedural rules that protect defendants from a prejudicial determina-
tion of guilt. The creation of an additional exception, abrogating the 
character evidence rule with respect to the battering parent syndrome, 
would unjustifiably eliminate this important protection. 
B. Undesirability of an Exception to the Character Evidence Rule 
for the Battering Parent Syndrome 
Notwithstanding the compelliQg public policy against child abuse, 
any need for an exception to the character evidence rule for the batter-
ing parent syndrome is outweighed by the law's interest in protecting 
the right of parents to a fair adjudication. 
Criminal Proceedings Against Abusing Parents: Individual Guilt 
in the Due Process Model- Not surprisingly, the argument for an ex-
ception to the character evidence rule has arisen in the context of pros-
ecutions for criminal child abuse. 101 Serious crimes engender serious 
exception is more difficult to justify. Cf supra note 82. Yet, because court themselves have 
suggested the possibility of future admissibility of the syndrome, judicial restraint does not ex-
plain their willingness to allow evidence of past abuse while excluding evidence of the battering 
parent syndrome. 
The second possible explanation has more force; intuitively if not legally. Courts are more 
suspicious of predictions of future behavior than of evidence of previous conduct. The empirical 
truth of this proposition may be deduced from the fact that courts permit the latter, but prohibit 
the former. See supra note 94. In State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981) the court 
expressly noted its skepticism of the predictive power of psychology. Yet recognition that courts 
view past episodes of abuse as more probative of propensity than a psychological profile ought 
not to obscure the fact that the rule prohibits either form of character evidence from being ad-
mitted to proof the act in question. E.g., FED. R. Evm. 404(a), (b). 
98. See supra note 94. 
99. E.g., Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 16 n.3, 18 (1983). 
100. E.g., Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13, 16 n.3, 17 n.4, 18 n.7 (1983); State 
v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981). 
IOI. E.g., State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 1981) ("The state's position is that 
the difficulties involved in prosecuting those who abuse children warrant an exception to the 
general rule."). 
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revulsion, and reasonable people feel little sympathy for child abusers. 
Yet it is exactly for the protection of persons charged with especially 
revolting crimes that our legal system embraces a due process model 
of criminal procedure. 102 Especially when the initial evidence seems over-
whelmingly to implicate a parent in the death of. her infant child, the 
law surrounds her with a presumption of innocence, 103 and burdens 
the state with proving beyond a reasonable doubt that this particular 
defendant committed the particular crime charged. 104 The character 
evidence rule's concern with protecting the defendant from prejudice 
addresses precisely this fundamental goal of the due process model. 105 
Character evidence is excluded for fear "that the jury will convict a 
defendant in order to penalize him for his past misdeeds, or simply 
because he is an undesirable person." 106 
However strong the state's need for evidence in an abuse prosecu-
tion, the alleged abusing parent ought to be entitled to the same ad-
judication of individual guilt as is any other criminal defendant. In 
this context, what is most offensive about using the battering parent 
syndrome to prove guilt is the suggestion of "corporate" guilt, arising 
out of similarity to other abusing parents. 
In the same way, the battering parent syndrome attacks the require-
ment that guilt attaches only to actual past acts or omissions, and not 
to state of mind, however wicked. 10 ' To the extent it suggests that guilt 
102. This label for the common law system of criminal justice, with its presumptions in favor 
and protections of the defendant, is based on H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANC-
TION (1968). 
103. Without exception, criminal courts recognize the common law presumption of innocence, 
while acknowledging that the legislature may by statute substitute a limited presumption of guilt 
in cases where a rational connection exists between defendants' behavior and the guilt presumed. 
For example, in Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 182-84 (1925) the Court held that 
a statute forbidding concealment of opium with knowledge of its importation satisfied due pro-
cess when posession was presumptive evidence of guilt. "Every accused person, of course, enters 
upon his trial clothed with the presumption of innocence. But that presumption may be over-
come, not only by direct proof, but ... by the additional weight of a countervailing legislative 
presumption." Id. at 184-85. For such a legislative presumption to satisfy due process, "it is 
only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate 
fact presumed." Id. at 183; (quoting Mobile R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 42-43 (1910)); 
accord United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 363 (1950); Michaelson v. United States, 266 
U.S. 42, 66 (1924); City of St. Paul v. Whidby, 295 Minn. 129, 138-43, 203 N.W.2d 823, 829-32 
(1972); State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465,472, 160 N.W.2d 146, 151 (1968); State v. Deike, 143 
Minn. 23, 172 N.W. 777 (1919). Professor Packer ties the presumption of innocence to the collo-
quial meaning of fairness, whose "simplest (if most neglected) meaning is that no one should 
be subjected to punishment without having an opportunity to litigate the issue of his· culpabil-
ity." H. PACKER, supra note 102, at 69. 
104. The notion that criminal guilt is personal with the individual(s) charged is expressed 
in the law's requirement of mens rea. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 
1962) (providing that no act is criminal unless committed purposely, knowingly, negligently or 
recklessly). 
105. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
106. State v. Loebach, 310 N.W. 2d 58, 63 (Minn. 1981). 
107. This requirement is reflected in part in our constitutional protection against ex post 
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inheres in membership in a class of parents statistically likely to abuse 
their children, proof of guilt by profile de-emphasizes the requirement 
of conduct. Professor Packer summarizes the law's requirement of in-
dividual guilt for particular crimes thus: 
[a]lthough it seeks to control the future by shaping the ways 
in which people behave and by intervening in the lives of peo-
ple who display anti-social propensities, the criminal law limits 
its effect and its intervention to the locus poenitentiae [point 
of no return] of what has in fact observably taken place in 
the past. 108 
Because even a highly accurate battering parent syndrome would sug-
gest the parent's guilt only insofar as it showed propensity to abuse, 109 
in a close case a jury's conviction might be based not on a statisfac-
tory showing of the proscribed conduct, but on the jury's knowledge 
of propensity. 110 Any inroads into the character evidence rule thus at-
tack directly the requirement of individual guilt. 
It may be argued that, as a pragmat~c matter, courts already admit 
"character" evidence in child abuse proceedings, by admitting past 
acts of abuse to prove matters other than propensity. 111 Juries seem 
quite unlikely to heed an instruction that they consider the past acts 
only on the issue of the defendant's intent to cause harm on this occa-
sion, and not on the issue of general propensity to abuse. 112 The result 
may be that the character evidence rule has already been abrogated 
sub silentio by the courts, leaving no reason to continue excluding the 
battering parent syndrome. 
There are three problems with this argument. First even if a jury 
disregards an instruction not to consider character evidence as proof 
of propensity, they have at least heard the instruction. It is impossible 
to estimate how salutory an effect such an instruction will have, but 
surely it will influence some jurors. Second, to the extent that courts 
are undermining the character evidence rule by admitting evidence of 
past acts of abuse, they are operating outside the legitimate scope of 
their authority. 1 1 3 The proper response to a small breach in the dike 
is to plug it, not to tear down whatever protection remains. 
facto laws. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
108. H. PACKER, supra note 102, at 96 (emphasis added). 
109. See supra note 20. 
I JO. In theory, the parent of an allegedly abused child is protected by the requirement of 
sufficiency of the evidence. See supra note 59. In practice, however, courts have been quite liberal 
in finding evidence sufficient in child abuse proceedings. See supra notes 6-7, 94. 
111. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. 
I 12. See, e.g., LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 59, at 214. 
I 13. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, even if courts continue to interpret liberally the existing ex-
ceptions to the character evidence rule, such a limited actual displace-
ment of the rule at least preserves an important theoretical principle: 
legal criminal guilt may not arise merely from the lifestyles or ways 
of thinking that characterize abusing parents. An explicit overriding 
of the character evidence rule by the battering parent syndrome, tend-
ing as it does to show guilt by analogy, would undermine this notion 
too substantially to be a tolerable rule. 
B. "Civil" Proceedings to Protect Endangered Children: Prejudice 
in the Adjudication of Abuse 
I. The Quasi-Criminal Character of Child Protection Proceedings-
Courts and commentators agree that the fundamental purpose of the 
rule excluding character evidence is to prevent a jury from penalizing 
a defeIJ.dant because they perceive her to be a bad person. 114 The family 
court's adjudication that a child is abused, of course, formally ad-
dresses no defendant and does not result in penal consequence to the 
parent. Yet the significant punitive dimension to an adjudication of 
abuse justifies treating the parent as a defendant, especially with regard 
to the exclusion of propensity evidence under the character evidence rule. 
While the proceeding may be directed only to determining whether 
a child meets the statutory definition of abused, the parent of a child 
so adjudged will be subjected to significant state intervention, including 
potential termination of her parental rights and potential criminal pros-
ecution. The law traditionally has accorded much deference to a parent's 
right to guide the upbringing of her child; to secure that right against 
unwarranted interference, child abuse proceedings generally prohibit 
inquiry into parental "fitness" until after an independent finding that 
the child is abused. Given the often difficult task of discriminating 
between acceptable differences in parenting style and unlawful neglect 
or abuse, 115 the law ought to secure the parent's interest that no mistake 
occurs in the adjudication. The law should therefore treat the parent's 
rights with the same care as if she were a defendant, inasmuch as this 
can be accomplished consistent with the protective purpose of the 
statutes. This is not to say that abuse adjudications ought to be sub-
ject to all the rules of criminal procedure. Clearly, the statutes em-
body an effort to protect endangered children, not to punish their 
parents. Where the child's interest in protection from abuse meets the 
parent's interest in retaining control, the statutes command that the 
latter must yield. 
114. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
115. See generally D. GIL, supra note I, at 8-17, 134-37. 
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In some areas, however, such legislative intent may conflict with over-
riding due process considerations. Thus, the Supreme Court has held 
that states may not terminate parental rights except on a finding by 
a jury of clear and convincing evidence of future danger to the child. 116 
This Note makes no attempt to prove that the character evidence rule 
is an element of constitutional due process in child abuse proceedings. 11 7 
It does argue, however, that the place of the character evidence rule 
in the due process model of criminal procedure so nearly touches the 
abuse and neglect adjudication model that the law should rely on the 
same considerations within both models to exclude the battering parent 
syndrome from evidence. 
2. Legislative Pre-Emption and the Danger of Prejudice- Although 
the parent in an abuse adjudication occupies a position somewhat dif-
ferent from that of a criminal defendant, a significant parental interest 
is at stake. 11 8 In addition, the exclusion mandated by the character 
evidence rule applies no less to civil than to criminal proceedings. 119 
For several reasons, character evidence in the form of the battering 
parent syndrome should be inadmissible in abuse adjudications. First, 
the child protection statutes permit an adjudication of abuse only on 
the basis of particular kinds of parental fault. 120 While state legislatures 
have authorized courts to examine the "immaturity" or "emotional 
disability" of a parent, they have not authorized an inquiry into pro-
pensity to abuse. 121 Since the legislatures have spoken with particular-
ity regarding which parent characteristics compose abuse, courts ought 
not to expand the statutory definitions to include propensity to abuse. 
Courts should consider themselves pre-empted from considering such 
evidence at the adjudication phase of a proceeding. 122 
Second, admission of evidence about the battering parent syndrome 
may direct the decisionmaker's thoughts from adjudication of abuse 
116. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982). 
117. Yet if the character evidence rule exists to ensure that defendants receive a fair ad-
judication of their individual guilt, see supra notes 102-113 and accompanying text, the rule 
may be thought to have its foundations in constitutional due process. To that extent, the substantial 
punitive dimension of child protection proceedings may likewise require a constitutional analysis. 
The Supreme Court has indicated that the mere fact that a judicial proceeding carries with it 
no formal criminal punishment does not mean that the constitution may not require more substantial 
due process protections in some civil proceedings where substantial parental interests are involved. 
See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25-34 (1981); Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745, 752-57 (1982). 
I 18. E.g., Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (finding that parent's 
right to " 'companionship, care, custody, and management' of [a child] is an important interest 
that 'undeniably warrants deference'") (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 631 (1972)). 
119. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.§ !IOI (West 1980) (stating that the rules of evidence apply 
to "all actions and proceedings in the courts of this state"). 
120. See supra notes 10, 52. 
121. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015 (10) (West 1978). See also supra notes 10, 52. 
122. This rule should not apply at the dispositional phase of the proceeding, where otherwise 
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to assessment of custody alternatives. Although abuse and placement 
decisions are made separately, and most jurisdictions provide for the 
adjudication of abuse by a judge rather than a jury, 123 concerns about 
prejudice remain. Lay testimony offered to support a battering parent 
profile might reveal particularly unappealing aspects of the parent's 
personality, subjecting even an experienced family court judge to the 
danger of prejudice. 124 The danger is not the expert presentation of 
characteristics of typical abusing parents, since such information would 
likely be superfluous to a judge with experience in child protection 
proceedings. The danger rather is that in shifting the focus of the in-
quiry from whether the child has been abused to the characteristics 
of the parent, the judge may be making the decision about best custody 
placement that the legislature deliberately def erred to the dispositional 
phase of the proceeding. The more evidence on the "unfitness" of 
the parent that arises through lay witness's discussion of her poor im-
pulse control or low empathy, the more likely the judge is to base the 
conclusion that abuse has occurred on these "unfitness" criteria, rather 
than on the criteria specified in the statutes. 125 Since an expert's recita-
tion of the characteristics of typical abusive parents may be assumed 
to be superfluous to an experienced judge, the danger of corroborative 
lay testimony prejudicing the judge against the parent surely "substan-
tially outweighs" the probative value of such testimony. 
Thus, despite the latitude permitted family courts to conduct child 
protection proceedings "in an informal manner," 126 family court judges 
ought not to permit the state to prove that a parent fits the battering 
parent syndrome at the adjudication phase of the proceeding. The par-
ental interests at stake are too great, and the helpfulness of such 
testimony too small thus to contravene the two-step proceeding con-
templated in the statutory child protection scheme. 
CONCLUSION 
The substantial difficulty of proof in legal proceedings involving child 
abuse undoubtedly requires the legal system to take extraordinary 
measures to enable the state effectively to protect children from parental 
inadmissible evidence is allowed by statute. See supra note 67. 
123. As of 1975, only twelve jurisdictions provided parents with a right to jury trial in child 
protection proceedings. Katz, Child Neglect Law in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. I, 32-33 (1975). 
124. While an inexperienced judge might find information on typical battering parents useful 
as background, such a judge would be more subject to the danger of prejudice. 
125. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 260.015 (6), (10) (West 1978). 
126. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 200.155(1) (West 1978). 
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abuse. 121 Despite the responsiveness of courts and legislatures, the prob-
lem persists. Although permitting the state to show the parent's similar-
ity to the battering parent profile may ease the state's burden in prov-
ing abuse, courts have correctly identified the procedure as proof by 
propensity, and have excluded it under the character evidence rule. 
Whatever the scientific accuracy of the battering parent syndrome, 
courts should continue to exclude it under the character evidence rule. 
The case for exclusion is most compelling in criminal proceedings, where 
permitting profile evidence to suggest an inference of guilt would under-
mine the defendant's due process right to a determination of individual 
guilt. Yet the significant punitive dimension that accompanies the 
deprivation of custody of a child argues almost as forcefully that similar• 
protection ought to be afforded the parent whose child is alleged, under 
the child protection laws, to have been abused or neglected. Resting 
proof of child abuse on the psychological profile of typical abusing 
parents injures too severely the notion of individual guilt to be a pru-
dent solution. 
Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. 
127. In addition to the criminal and civil abuse proceedings discussed in this Note, the legal 
system could aid the cause of eradicating child abuse by fostering such currently extra-legal organiza-
tions as Parents Anonymous. See generally Lieber, Parent's Anonymous: A New Direction Against 
Child Abuse, in NAT. COMM. FOR PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE, CHILD ABUSE: PRESENT AND 
FUTURE 53 (1975); Pike, Professionals Are Not the Only Answer, in id. at 215. There would 
appear to be no impediment to a family court judge ordering participation in such a self-help 
group as an alternative to traditional counseling or foster care. 

